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LABOR LAW: EMPLOYER'S GRANT OF BENEFITS PRIOR
TO REPRESENTATION ELECTION HELD NOT TO
CONSTITUTE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
SECTION 8 (a) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees"' in the exercise of their statutory right to form labor organi-
zations, as guaranteed by section 7 of the act.2 In the recent case of
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that an employer's unconditional grant of benefits to
employees during a pre-election period did not violate the act, not-
withstanding a finding that the employer conferred the benefits for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of the representation elec-
tion. In so holding, the court enunciated a rather disparate and
restrictive interpretation of when increased benefits will constitute
employer interference under section 8 (a) (1).
The Exchange Parts case arose when an employer instituted a
revamped vacation system and a different method for calculating
overtime during the interval between issuance by the National Labor
Relations Board of an order for a representation election and the
time the election took place.4 After company employees rejected
the union at the polls,5 the trial examiner and the NLRB both found
that the company had committed an unfair labor practice by granting
the benefits with the intent of influencing the outcome of the
I National Labor Relations Act § 8 (a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a) (1) (1958).
2
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title." National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
3504 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1962), denying enforcement of 131 N.L.R.B. 806 (1961),
petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3157 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1962) (No. 537).
'The Board also found that the employer committed an unfair labor practice
by timing the announcement of the date of a previously granted paid holiday so as
to influence the election. The court, however, determined that there was no substantial
evidence on which the Board could base such a conclusion and overruled the Board's
finding on this point. The duty of the circuit court to accept a finding of fact
made by the Board for which there is substantial evidence is stated in note 8 infra.
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election." The employer refused to abide by the Board's order to
cease and desist from granting further benefits pending the outcome
of a new election, 7 and the Board petitioned the Fifth Circuit for
enforcement. The court accepted the finding of fact that the
benefits were granted for the purpose of influencing the election,8
but concluded that enforcement should be denied, since the benefits
actually and unconditionally had been granted and did not, there-
fore, meet the court's newly, formulated test requiring "objective
evidence of restraint or coercion."9,
The NLRB has traditionally subjected pre-election grants of
benefits by employers to careful scrutiny.'0 While refusing to char-
acterize grants of benefit as per se interference with elections,", the
Board has applied two ostensibly conflicting tests in determining
whether such grants violate the act. One test makes it unlawful
for an employer to grant benefits with the intent to induce employees
to reject union representation. 2  The second test disregards the
purpose of the employer's act and looks to its effect. More exactly,
a grant of benefit is unlawful if a reasonable inference can be drawn
that such conduct tended to interfere with the employee's right to
a free choice.18 Upon analysis, it is submitted that the apparent in-
consistency of such a double faceted approach resolves itself into
alternative requirements of proof on the part of complainants. Thus
if increased benefits did influence the election, the question of
6 Exchange Parts Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 806 (1961).
" The Board is empowered to issue a cease and desist order against any employer
found guilty of an unfair labor practice, but must petition a court of appeals to
enforce such order in the event that it is not honored by the offending party.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 10(c), (e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160 (c), (e) (1958).
' "The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." National
Labor Relations Act § 10 (e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
For a discussion of the substantial evidence rule, see Green, Evidence of Unfair
Labor Practices under the Taft-Hartley Act, 26 N.C.L. REv. 253 (1948).
304 F.2d at 372.
20 "[I]nterference is no less interference because it is accomplished through allure-
ments rather than coercion, when, as here, the system is employed to stem a tide of
organization .-..." Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, 134 F.2d 240, 244 (7th Cir. 1943).
21 See, e.g., Glosser Bros., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 965 (1958); Bata Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B.
1239 (1956); United Screw & Bolt Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 916 (1950).
12 Hudson Hosiery Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1434, 1436 (1947). Accord, Pinkerton Folding
Box Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1958); Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332
(1958); Automotive Supply Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1957).
13 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1948); American Freightways,
Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959).
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motive is immaterial; but if it cannot be proved that the benefits
influenced the election, a violation may be found by a showing of
improper motive. Under either test, the rationale seems to be that
while unilateral grants of benefit are permissible under exceptional
circumstances, such benefits are inherently antithetic to the purposes
of section 8 (a) (1) and usually should be prohibited. This conflict
arises, not because such grants are necessarily restrictive or coercive,
but because they substantially interfere with employee rights by
demonstrating and emphasizing that "there is no necessity for a
collective bargaining agent"'14 and, accordingly, that resort to self-
organization is unnecessary.15
Applying these tests, the Board and courts consistently have
held that granting benefits constitutes an unfair labor practice where
the benefits were promised or conferred upon the express or implied
condition that the employees abandon the union or reject it at the
polls during a representation election.1" Benefits given to only a
few employees within a unit have been held to approach the tenor
of bribes. 7 Furthermore, benefits conferred by employees engaged
in other questionable activities, such as interrogations, threats, or
espionage, have been held to be unfair labor practices and further
increases have been prohibited.18 The end result of the approach
" May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 385 (1945).
Ir See NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955); Joy Silk Mills,
Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); NLRB
v. Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1950); Joslin Dry Goods Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 555
(1957).
" Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (wage increase con-
ferred to induce employees to leave union); NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 199 F.2d 711,
712 (9th Cir. 1952) (benefits promised "to dampen the ardor of the employees for
union affiliation"); Gorbea' Perez & Morell, S. en C., 133 N.L.R.B. 362 (1961)
(promise of benefits conditioned on maintenance of nonunion status quo).
2 "Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961); Pinkerton Folding Box Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1958). In recognition of this evil, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959
amended § 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act and made it unlawful for any employer to
pay "to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer employed
in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal compensation for the pur-
pose of causing such employee or group or committee directly or indirectly to in-
fluence any other employees in the exerdse of the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing." Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 505 (a) (3), 73 Stat. 537-38 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. I, 1961), amending Labor Management Relations Act § 302 (a),
61 Stat. 157 (1947).
2' See NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1953) (interroga-
tions); NLRB v. Crown Can Co., 138 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1943) (threats); M. H. Ritz-
woller Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1940) (threats and interrogations); Avildsen
Tool & Machs., Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1955) (threats).
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taken in these cases seems to be that a unilateral grant of benefits
by an employer will be an unfair labor practice, unless the employer
can justify the increase on grounds unrelated to the election. Thus,
the employer has been allowed to show that benefits were granted
in accordance with a policy established antecedent to the pre-election
period.19
Exchange Parts rejected the established tests used by the Board
and required "objective evidence of restraint or coercion"20 to be
shown before an added benefit would support an unfair labor
practice charge. The decision thereby summarily stripped the
words "interfere with" of any legal significance, despite their express
recital in the statute in conjunction with "restrain" and "coerce."
The court, emphasizing that the increase in benefits in no way de-
prived the employees of their freedom to vote for the union, reasoned
that the three prohibitions recited in section 8 (a) (1) are in apposi-
tion with one another and do not comprehend "three separate cate-
gories"21 of unfair employer actions. Under this newly espoused
test, interference, to be violative of the act, must result in substantial
pressure that embodies coercion or restraint. By thus postulating
duress as an essential element of a section 8 (a) (1) violation, not only
are the tests utilized by the Board rejected, but there is a wholesale
denial of the efficacy of the concept that section 8 (a) (1) can be
violated by an employer demonstrating and emphasizing that col-
lective bargaining is unnecessary.
From an analysis of prior cases, however, the court determined
that its decision was not inconsistent with precedent. Drawing a
distinction between promised and conferred benefits, it concluded
that prior cases have found the former unlawful because they force
employees to choose between the employer's immediate offer and the
more remote benefits to be derived from union membership. While
the court is correct in concluding that promised benefits have been
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. Cleveland Trust Co., 214 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1954) (increased
wages to meet inflationary rise in cost of living); NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 208 F.2d
710 (4th Cir. 1953) (increased wages under policy of paying same wage scale as rival
store); Hudson Optical, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 149 (1958) (wage increase following pattern
of annual wage increases). The burden is clearly on the employer to show that the
conferring of benefits was governed by factors unrelated to the election. See Glosser
Bros., 120 N.L.R.B. 965 (1958); Bata Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1956); Knickerbocker
Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 507 (1953).
"304 F.2d at 372. (Emphasis added.)
'x Id. at 374. But see Myers, "Interference" in Labor Relations Acts, 19 B.U.L. Rv.
208 (1939).
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the inducement in numerous past cases, 22 there is no paucity of
cases wherein conferred benefits have been held to constitute unfair
labor practices. 23  It is submitted, furthermore, that the question of a
violation has never turned on a distinction between the two. Under
the court's test, requiring that restraint or coercion be shown, such
a distinction may be viable, since promises may exert considerably
more direct pressure on employees than conferred benefits. 24  But
from the viewpoint of the Board, unfair practices take place when-
ever the employer demonstrates that employee self-organization is un-
necessary, and the distinction loses its significance. Applying inter-
ference as the criterion, conferred and promised benefits both would
seem to have the unlawful effect of emphasizing the futility of resort-
ing to a bargaining agent.
With regard to cases wherein conferred benefits were found to
violate the act, the court concluded that such benefits were held
unlawful because they were part of an "overall scheme" 2 of illegal
acts which put substantial pressure on the employees. While courts
have made reference to the presence of other unfair labor practices,
the significance attached to them has been to evidence the employer's
motive in granting the increase.26  Presumably, if, as was the case
in Exchange Parts, the intent of the employer could have been
shown without reference to other unfair practices, then the presence
of other unfair practices would have been immaterial in determining
whether an increased benefit violated section 8 (a) (1).
Though departing from previous Board interpretation and the
apparent meaning of the statute, the court's interpretation of the
words "interfere with" find support in the legislative history of a
parallel section adopted twelve years later in the Taft-Hartley Act
-2 See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950); NLRB
v. Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1950).
"See NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Louisville Container Corp., 209 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting
Co., 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Crown Can Co., 138 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.
1943); Standard Fittings Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 928 (1961).
"4 Promised benefits, because they lack the finality and degree of commitment by the
employer found in a benefit actually conferred, might make an employee feel that
he is placed in a situation wherein he must choose an alternative favored by the
employer in order to gain what has been promised but not granted.
.5 304 F.2d at 373.
20 NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955) (illegal firing and
interrogating of employees); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1953) (threat to dose plant); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (threats and illegal interrogations).
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of 1947. This act added section 8 (b) (1) to the Wagner Act of 1935,
making it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "re-
strain or coerce''27 either employees or employers in the exercise of
their respective rights during an organizational period. In explain-
ing the obvious diversity between the language in section 8 (a) (1)
regarding employers and section 8 (b) (1) regarding labor organiza-
tions, the House Conference Report expressed the joint committee's
belief that the NLRB heretofore had not found interference where
there was not also restraint or coercion.28 The Report went on to
admonish that omission of the words "interfere with" from section
8 (b) (1) was not to be construed so as to give independent meaning
to those words in the previously enacted section 8 (a) (1). Although
the conclusion regarding the Board's interpretation of section
8 (a) (1) is open to question,29 the plain inference to be drawn from
the language in the Report is that forthwith interference should
not be separately categorized from restraint or coercion.
The weight to be attached to the expression of intendment found
in the Conference Report is a problem difficult to resolve for a
number of reasons. What Congress enacted was the legislation
itself and not the Conference Report. Indeed, the statement made
by the 1947 Report on the meaning to be given the then twelve year
old section 8 (a) (1) is the purest form of dicta. Moreover, it is a
reasonable inference that Congress intended to give distinct legal
significance to the phrase "interfere with," particularly in light of
its deliberate omission from section 8 (b) (1) and the failure of Con-
gress to eliminate it from section 8 (a) (1) when presented with the
clear opportunity to do so in 1947.
However, there are policy considerations which may tend to
substantiate the interpretation given the statute by the Conference
Report and by the Fifth Circuit in the instant case. If the labor
legislation of the past three decades has been inspired by a desire
to strike a workable power balance between labor and management,30
27 Labor-Management Relations Act § 101, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1)
(1958), amending National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
28 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947). The House Conference
Report is cited herein to lend support to the position of the court in the instant case.
It is brought to the attention of the reader, however, that the Report is not cited by
the court itself in the course of its decision.
20 See 54 HARV. L. REv. 1036 (1941).
"0 See Farmer, The Taft-Hartley Act and the Balance of Power in Labor Relations,
51 W. VA. L.Q. 141 (1949).
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then it is not unreasonable for the court to assume that the language
of the act was intended to be flexible in order to accomplish this
purpose. Because labor, through legislation and its own efforts, has
achieved a position of redoubtable strength on the national scene,
strict application of statutory prohibitions against management,
under present conditions, might tend to create an imbalance favor-
able to labor and if so would be inconsistent with the fundamental
-objectives of the act. Viewed in this perspective, the court's tenuous
analysis of statutory language and judicial precedent may have
achieved a result pragmatically sound and reasonably within the
confines of the spirit of the statute.
